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In October 2012, a hepatitis A (HA) outbreak with 83 
laboratory-confirmed cases occurred in Lower Saxony. 
We defined primary outbreak cases as people with 
laboratory-confirmed HA and symptom onset between 
8 October and 12 November 2012, residing in or visit-
ing the affected districts. Secondary outbreak cases 
were persons with symptom onset after 12 November 
2012 and close contact with primary cases. We identi-
fied 77 primary and six secondary cases. We enrolled 
50 primary cases and 52 controls matched for age and 
sex, and found that 82% of cases and 60% of con-
trols had consumed products from a particular bak-
ery (OR=3.09; 95% CI: 1.15–8.68). Cases were more 
likely to have eaten sweet pastries (OR=5.74; 95% CI: 
1.46–22.42). Viral isolates from five selected cases 
and three positively tested surfaces in the bakery 
had identical nucleotide sequences. One additional 
identical isolate derived from a salesperson of the 
bakery suffering from a chronic disease that required 
immunosuppressive treatment. Epidemiological and 
laboratory findings suggested that the salesperson 
contaminated products while packing and selling. 
Future risk assessment should determine whether food 
handlers with chronic diseases under immunosuppres-
sive treatment could be more at risk of contaminating 
food and might benefit from HAV immunisation. 
Introduction
Background
On 31 October 2012, the local health authorities of the 
neighbouring districts of A and B in Lower Saxony, 
northern Germany, detected an increase of hepati-
tis A (HA) cases. Thirteen serologically-confirmed HA 
cases had been notified within three days (incidence: 
7.76 per 100,000 inhabitants) whereas during October 
to December 2011, only one case (incidence: 0.37 per 
100,000 inhabitants) was notified in the same area. 
Notification of laboratory-confirmed infection with 
hepatitis A virus (HAV) and notification of clinical cases 
of viral hepatitis are mandatory in Germany. From 2001 
to 2011 in Lower Saxony, the incidence of notified HA 
cases declined substantially. Fitting a linear trend to 
the incidence rate per 100,000 population reveals an 
average reduction by 0.13 per year, from 2.13 in 2001 
down to 0.78 in 2011. During this time, the proportion 
of cases that could be assigned to known outbreaks 
was 28% on annual average with a slightly increasing 
trend (unpublished data).
In general, the true number of infections is presumed 
to be higher than the number of notified cases due 
to underreporting and the fact that many individuals, 
especially children, may experience HAV infection with-
out symptoms [1].
HAV is transmitted by the faecal-oral route, either by a 
direct contact with a contagious person infected with 
HAV or by ingestion of HAV-contaminated food or water 
or from contaminated surfaces [2]. The average incuba-
tion period of HA is 28 days (range: 15–50 days) [3]. The 
period of highest infectiousness is assumed to range 
from two weeks before until one week after onset of 
jaundice. Viral shedding with highest HAV concentra-
tion in stool occurs before jaundice [4].
Food items that have been described or assumed to 
have caused HA outbreaks include mussels, oysters, 
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vegetables and salad fertilised with faeces [5,6], fruits 
including raw blueberries [7], frozen raspberries [8], 
frozen strawberries [9], green onions [10] and shellfish 
[11]. Contamination of food by infected food handlers 
in restaurants has also been described [12]. Several 
HA outbreaks have been associated with bakeries [13]. 
In an outbreak observed in 1968 in Michigan, United 
States (US), the vehicle of infection was pastries cov-
ered with glaze or icing [14]. In an outbreak in New 
York, US, HA was associated with sugar-glazed baked 
goods [15]. An HA outbreak took place in Germany in 
2004 where a bakery employee most probably contam-
inated the products that caused the outbreak [13].
The tenacity of HAV is higher than of other non-envel-
oped viruses belonging to the family of Picornaviridae. 
The ability of HAV to survive on hands and on inanimate 
surfaces plays an important role for HAV transfer from 
hands of infectious persons to food items and from con-
taminated surfaces to fingertips [16,17]. Disinfection 
with alcohol and hydrogen peroxide (3% and 6% con-
centration) has been found ineffective against HAV on 
surfaces [18]. According to Mbithi, unmedicated liquid 
soap was ineffective for reducing virus titre on hands 
[18], indicating that hand washing with ordinary soap 
is not sufficient to prevent HAV transmission. HAV is 
acid-stable [19] and seems to remain viable while pass-
ing through the stomach [1]. The minimum infectious 
dose is estimated to be very low with 10–100 virus 
particles. The amount of HAV shed by infected humans 
ranges from 106 to 108 virus particles per 1 gram of 
stool [20,21].
In cooperation with local and regional public health and 
food safety authorities, we conducted epidemiological, 
laboratory and molecular investigations to identify the 
vehicle of the outbreak to prevent further cases. The 
local health authorities were aware that both of the 
most-affected villages had a shop of a bakery com-
pany (bakery X); this bakery runs four shops in total. 
Additionally, during the standardised interviews, cases 
reported, without being asked, having observed signs 
of jaundice in a bakery X employee. Taking into con-
sideration the literature on bakery-associated HA out-
breaks [13–15], a causal link to bakery X or its products 
was a major hypothesis for the outbreak investigation.
Methods
Case definition
Based on the regional and temporal distribution of 
cases, we defined primary outbreak cases as persons:
•	 residing in the affected districts (A or B) or having 
visited the outbreak area during 15 September to 
03 October 2012 and
•	 reported with serologically-confirmed HAV infection 
and
•	 with disease onset between 8 October and 12 
November 2012.
Serologically confirmed HAV infection was defined 
as IgM and/or IgG positive results, depending on the 
time lag between apparent symptoms and taking of 
blood sample. If sequencing data were available and 
did not match the outbreak strain, the person was not 
regarded as case. We excluded cases with travel his-
tory to HA-endemic areas during the probable period 
of infection.
Secondary outbreak cases were defined as persons:
•	 reported with serologically-confirmed HAV infection 
and
•	 suffering from HA with onset after 12 November 
2012 and
•	 having close contact with primary outbreak cases.
In the course of the outbreak investigation, two HAV-
infected persons were detected who did not meet the 
primary and secondary outbreak case definition but 
appeared to be important to clarify the outbreak. We 
refer to them as early cases and they were defined as 
persons:
•	 with serologically-confirmed HAV infection (IgG and 
IgM) and
•	 with symptom onset before 8 October 2012 and
•	 residing in the outbreak area.
Cases are described in terms of time, place and demo-
graphic information.
Case–control study
In a case–control study, we investigated the hypoth-
eses that the occurrence of disease was associated 
with bakery X in general, with particular food items 
from bakery X, or with other exposures like festivals 
and markets in the outbreak area during time of infec-
tion. We also considered well-known risk factors for 
HAV infection such as travelling abroad or consuming 
seafood.
We aimed to recruit primary outbreak cases accord-
ing to the case definition with the following additional 
restrictions:
•	 at least 18 years of age and
•	 physical and mental state and language skills suffi-
cient to allow successful participation in the inter-
view and
•	 no household contact with the suspected early 
cases (because such persons might have had other 
routes of transmission than the majority of cases).
We recruited control persons by random-digit dial-
ling, aiming for a case–control ratio of 1:1. We used 
an approach adapted to the German landline system 
[22] since landlines are still common in the outbreak 
region. The landline telephone numbers of residen-
tial cases were modified by incrementing the last two 
digits. This was to ensure a regional matching of con-
trols with the cases. In addition, the controls were 
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frequency-matched to the cases by sex and five-year 
age bands. Persons were not selected as controls if 
they reported symptoms of HAV infection, a history of 
HAV infection, or an HAV vaccination (other than recent 
post-exposure vaccination). For the interviews, we 
used standardised questionnaires for cases and con-
trols. Both cases and controls were interviewed within 
two weeks after notification of the cases by trained 
interviewers. The exposure data were dichotomised by 
classifying ‘don’t know’ and ‘no reply’ into one group. 
The associations were estimated by univariable and 
multivariable logistic regression analyses. All expo-
sures were investigated and assessed by odds ratios 
(OR) with 95% confident intervals (CI) and two-tailed 
p-values of chi-squared test. Exposure variables with 
an OR>1 and a p-value<0.2 in univariable analysis were 
included in a multivariable logistic regression analy-
sis. A stepwise backward elimination was used until all 
remaining variables were significant at the 0.05 level, 
keeping age and sex in the model. Statistical analyses 
were performed with Stata version 12.1.
Laboratory diagnostics of human samples
During their initial diagnostic workup, specimens from 
the cases were usually analysed in the contract labora-
tories used by the cases’ various general practitioners. 
Thus, the investigating authorities did not have direct 
access to these samples and we performed additional 
laboratory investigations.
In order to compare the HAV sequences, we investi-
gated specimens from one of the two suspected early 
cases, a bakery X employee, together with five of the 
suspected primary outbreak cases, particularly pri-
mary outbreak cases who were not resident in the two 
affected districts, to identify whether they all belonged 
to the same outbreak. Blood and faecal specimens of 
bakery X staff were screened with the aim to clarify 
their infection status, to detect potentially HAV posi-
tive persons and to determine whether contamination 
by a virus shedding employee could have been the 
source of the outbreak.
All serum specimens were serologically tested by 
enzyme immuno assay (EIA) for IgM and IgG anti-HAV 
using an automated system (Architect i2000SR, Abbott 
Diagnostics). The serum and faecal specimens were 
analysed for the presence of viral HAV RNA using a 
reverse transcription PCR.
Environmental investigation
We analysed surface swabs which were taken indoors 
in all four bakery X shops (hereafter referred to as A, B, 
C, D, Figure 1). HAV RNA was isolated by using a QIAmp 
Viral RNA Mini Kit (Qiagen). Subsequently, a real-time 
reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) was used for detect-
ing HAV RNA in surface specimens following the meth-
ods of Costafreda et al. [23].
Genotyping/sequencing
At the German Consultant Laboratory for Hepatitis A 
and Hepatitis E, HAV RNA was amplified from IgM posi-
tive serum and stool specimens as well as from posi-
tive surface specimens.
Nucleic acid isolation was performed using the RNeasy 
Mini Kit (Qiagen) with 100 µl elution volume (RNase-
free water). A 10 µl aliquot of the eluate was used for 
reverse transcription in a total reaction volume of 20 
µl using Moloney murine leukaemia virus (M-MuLV) 
reverse transcriptase (Applied Biosystems) and random 
hexamers according to the manufacturer’s instructions 
(42 degrees Celsius, 30 minutes). Two replicates were 
analysed in 30 µl PCRs each containing 10 µl of the 
Table 1
Primer and probe sequence, hepatitis A outbreak, northern Germany, 2012
Assay and gene 
target Primer or probe
Amplicon 
size (bp) Primer or probe sequence (5’–3’)
a Nucleotide positions or accession 
numberb
RT-qPCR NC_001489
Polymerase SH-Poly-Ac 107 GARTTTACTCAGTGTTCAATGAATGT 5964–5989
Polymerase SH-Poly-1c GGCATAGCTGCAGGAAAATT 6051–6070
Polymerase SH-Poly-Qc FAM-TCTCCAAAACGCTTTTTAGAAAGAGTCC-BHQ-1 5992–6019
Sequencing
VP1/P2A HAV6d 542 TGTCTGGAGCACTGGATGG 2839–2857
VP1/P2A HAV7d CATTTCAAGAGTCCACACACTTCT 3357–3380
VP1/P2A HAV8d 397 TGGTTTCTATTCAGATTGCAAATTA 2890–2914
VP1/P2A HAV9d TTCATTATTTCATGCTCCTCAGT 3264–3286
NT: nucleotide.
a Hydrolysis probes were labelled with 6-carboxyfluorescein (FAM) at the 5’ end and a nonfluorescent quencher (BHQ-1) at the 3’ end.
b Reference sequence accession numbers are for the databases of GenBank, the European Nucleotide Archive (ENA), and the DNA Data Bank of 
Japan (DDBJ).
c Primer reported by Houde et al. 2007 [25].
d Primer reported by Grinde et al. 1997 [26].
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RT product (corresponding to 5 µl eluate), ROX buffer, 
5.0 mmol/l MgCl2, 1.25 U AmpliTaq Gold DNA polymer-
ase (all Applied Biosystems), dNTPs, specific primers 
(300 nmol/l each) and TaqMan hydrolysis probe (200 
nmol/l). Table 1 shows the nucleotide sequences of 
the primers and probe used for the HAV reverse-tran-
scription quantitative real-time PCR (RT-qPCR) assay 
in the viral polymerase region: SH-Poly-A, SH-Poly-1 
and SH-Poly-Q [24]. Thermal cycling was performed on 
a StepOnePlus instrument (Applied Biosystems) and 
comprised a 10-minute initial enzyme activation step at 
95 degrees Celsius, and 45 cycles of 95 degrees Celsius 
for 15 seconds and 60 degrees Celsius for 1 minute.
 
RT-qPCR positive isolates were further characterised 
by amplicon sequencing. The initial amplification was 
performed by using specific primers [25] for the HAV 
VP1/P2A genomic region (HAV6, HAV7, 542 bp). A 2.5 µl 
aliquot from the first round of PCR was then used as a 
template in the second round of PCR with primers HAV8 
and HAV9 (397 bp). The PCR products were purified by 
using QIAquick columns (Qiagen) and sequenced in 
both directions with the second-round amplification 
primers.
Nucleotide sequences of amplicons were determined 
by using the BigDye Terminator Cycle Sequencing Kit 
(Applied Biosystems) and separated on a model 3730xl 
genetic analyser (Applied Biosystems). Nucleotide 
sequences of PCR products were analysed by using 
CodonCode Aligner 4.1.1 software (CodonCode 
Corporation, Centerville, MA, USA).
GenBank was searched for sequences with high simi-
larity using the BLAST and FASTA algorithms as imple-
mented by the HUSAR Biocomputing Service at DKFZ, 
Heidelberg, Germany. A rooted maximum likelihood 
phylogenetic consensus tree for VP1/P2A nucleotide 
sequences was inferred using PHYLIP 3.69 software.
Figure 1
Primary cases of hepatitis A, by residence, and bakery X shops selling bakery X goods, hepatitis A outbreak, northern 
Germany, 2012
For data protection purposes, cases’ home addresses were randomly distributed an average of 250m east/west and 250m north/south for 
locations within villages, and 1 km east/west and 1 km north/south for locations outside villages.
Shop B
Shop C
Shop DShop A
HAV cases
Bakery shops
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Results
Descriptive epidemiology
A total of 83 outbreak cases with disease onset 
between 8 October and 29 December 2012 were identi-
fied (77 primary and six secondary outbreak cases).
The median age of the primary cases was 44 years 
(range: 4–77 years) and 78% of the cases (n=61) were 
18 years and older. A total of 45% of the cases were 
female (Figure 2).
We found that 77 cases (91%) were residents of the dis-
tricts of A (n=52) and B (n=25) in Lower Saxony. The 
primary cases’ places of residence (not including the 
visitors) were clustered mainly around two bakery X 
shops (shop A and B, see Figure 1).
Seven primary cases were visitors to A or B from dif-
ferent German districts during the possible period 
of infection (15 September–3 October 2012). Three 
of these seven stayed in the area for the weekend of 
22–23 September 2012, two more spent a holiday from 
15 to 29 September 2012, and two worked regularly in 
this area but lived in other districts.
Disease onset for the first primary outbreak case was 
8 October 2012 (calendar week (CW) 41). The outbreak 
peaked in CW 43 and 44 and ended in CW 52 (Figure 3). 
Besides the notified cases, the outbreak investigation 
revealed two persons having experienced HAV infec-
tion with an earlier disease onset than the primary 
outbreak cases. Thus we categorised them as ‘early 
cases’. One was a bakery X employee. This person 
was not involved in preparing products but sold prod-
ucts in shop A and B and packed products for shop C 
and D. Henceforward this particular employee will be 
referred to as ‘the salesperson’ (although the bakery 
X shops had several other salespersons), and we will 
use the pronoun ‘they’. Onset of jaundice was early 
October 2012 (CW 39). The other early case was a close 
contact with disease onset early September 2012 (CW 
36, Figure 3). These two infections only became known 
to the health authorities in the course of the outbreak 
investigation. They had not previously been notified 
to the surveillance system. A second employee of bak-
ery X was notified as a case, but their disease onset 
occurred at the peak of the outbreak (CW 44).
Case-control study
Of the total 77 primary outbreak cases, we enrolled 50 
cases (including six who were not resident in district 
A or B) in the case–control study together with 52 fre-
quency-matched controls. The median age of enrolled 
cases was 51 years (range: 18–77 years) and of controls 
52 years (range: 27–80 years). The sex distribution was 
almost equal. A total of 25 of the 50 cases were female, 
as were 30 (58%) of 52 controls.
Figure 2
Age and sex distribution of primary hepatitis A outbreak cases, northern Germany, 2012 (n=77)
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Figure 3
Hepatitis A outbreak cases by reported onset of illness per 
calendar week, northern Germany, 2012 (n=85)
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The univariable analysis revealed a significant asso-
ciation between HAV infection and being a customer of 
bakery X (Table 2).
A total of 41 of the 50 cases reported eating bakery X 
products, as did 31 of 52 controls (OR: 3.09; 95% CI: 
1.15–8.68; p=0.013). None of the other exposures, 
which were unrelated to bakery X, was significantly 
associated with the disease. To find out more about the 
specific products of bakery X, we performed a nested 
analysis (Table 3) of cases and controls who were cus-
tomers of the bakery. Sweet pastries (OR: 5.97; 95% 
CI: 1.43–34.91; p=0.005), apple cake (OR: 3.86; 95% 
CI: 0.89–23.18; p = 0.043), and Bienenstich (a German 
cake typically made with a custard, buttercream or 
cream filling) (OR: 4.68; 95% CI:0.87–46.58; p=0.043) 
were significantly associated with HAV infection in uni-
variable models. In a multivariable modelling approach 
adjusted for age and sex and other bakery products, 
only consumption of sweet pastries remained signifi-
cant (ORadj: 5.74; 95% CI: 1.46–22.42; p = 0.012). Five 
of six non-residents were among the group of bakery 
X customers who reported having eaten sweet pastries 
or cake.
Laboratory diagnostics
Six persons fulfilling the spatial and temporal require-
ments of the primary outbreak case definition provided 
specimens for additional testing. In addition, speci-
mens were collected from both the early cases. They 
all tested positive for recent HAV infection (IgG and IgM 
positive). HAV RNA in stool specimens was detected 
for one early case, the salesperson. No HAV RNA was 
available for the salesperson’s contact. The salesper-
son suffered from an underlying condition that may 
prolong shedding of the virus. Follow up investiga-
tions revealed that the salesperson was shedding a 
large amount of HAV (4.5x104 copies/ml) for about six 
months.
There were 43 other bakery staff members, of whom 14 
did not provide specimens (including the HAV positive 
employee in CW 44). A total of 24 employees tested 
HAV-antibody negative. Of the remaining five, four 
had been vaccinated or had a previous HAV infection, 
results showing them to be IgG positive and IgM nega-
tive; the salesperson had an acute HAV infection, as 
indicated above.
Environmental investigation
Surfaces in all four bakery X shops were examined. 
Overall, 129 swabs were taken from surfaces in the 
kitchen, bathrooms and sales spaces. HAV RNA was 
detected by PCR in four swabs from two bakery shops 
(A and B, Figure 1) at the following locations:
Table 2
Results of univariable analysis of the case–control study among cases and controls, hepatitis A outbreak, northern Germany, 
2012 (n=102)
Exposure Cases (n = 50) Controls (n = 52) OR 95% CI p-value
Dried tomatoes 5 3 1.80 0.39–9.63 0.458
Mussels 2 4 0.50 0.06–2.97 0.428
Event/fair 23 20 0.93 0.41–2.15 0.879
Frozen berries 8 9 0.91 0.31–2.65 0.865
Bakery X customer 41 31 3.09 1.15–8.86 0.013
OR: odds ratio; CI: confidence intervals.
Table 3
Results of univariable and multivariable analysis of the case–control study among bakery X customers, hepatitis A outbreak, 
northern Germany, 2012 (n=72)
Univariable analysis
Exposure (products 
of bakery X)
Cases exposed to 
bakery X (n = 41)
Controls exposed to 
bakery X (n = 31) OR 95% CI p-value
Bread and rolls 35 26 1.12 0.24 - 4.95 0.861
Tarts 6 1 5.14 0.56–244.26 0.106
Apple cake 12 3 3.86 0.89–23.18 0.043
Bienenstich 12 2 4.68 0.87–46.58 0.043
Sweet pastries 16 3 5.97 1.43–34.91 0.005
Multivariable analysis
adjusted for age and sex
Sweet pastries 16 3 5.74 1.46–22.42 0.012
OR: odds ratio; CI: confidence intervals.
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•	 cash desk and refrigerator handle (shop A)
•	 PC keyboard and door handle of staff toilet (shop B)
Three of the four surface specimens contained enough 
HAV RNA for molecular sequencing.
Analyses of food items were not conducted because no 
leftover samples were available.
Molecular biology
The PCR analysis for HAV demonstrated that seven 
human and three surface specimens contained suffi-
cient HAV RNA to be molecularly sequenced. These 10 
specimens were reanalysed using a nested PCR pro-
tocol targeting the variable VP1/P2A genomic region 
(Table 1).
Sequence analysis of the 349 bp amplicons (PCR 
primer sequences not included) revealed nine isolates 
(three surface and six human specimens) with identical 
nucleotide sequences (Figure 4).
For the outbreak isolate (accession number HF677201), 
the closest matches in the EMBL viral sequence database 
(accessed April 2013) were strain TunS4–01, isolated 
in 2001 in Tunisia (acc. AY875664) and strain number 
148, isolated in 2007 in Germany (acc. EU416238), both 
with 98.9% identity. Phylogenetic analysis allowed the 
two novel isolates to be classified as HAV genotype I, 
subgenotype IA (Figure 4). Genotype and subgenotype 
nomenclatures were applied according to a previously 
proposed classification scheme [26].
One of the seven human isolates (HSCK100034 (acc. 
HF677202)), differs significantly from the sequence 
with 21 mismatches, translating into 94% similarity 
(Figure 5).
Consequently, this person was not regarded as a case 
belonging to this outbreak. They were a sporadic visi-
tor to the B district, had not visited to the narrower 
outbreak region, and had not consumed products from 
bakery X.
Outbreak management
The local health authorities began management of the 
outbreak immediately after the first notifications. The 
most important measures to control the outbreak were 
the vaccination of all susceptible bakery X employees 
and cases’ household contacts, and the cancellation of 
a fair that was to be held in the most affected village. 
In addition, the above-mentioned laboratory testing of 
bakery X staff and surface sampling in bakery X were 
part of the control strategy, as they facilitate the exclu-
sion of infectious staff members from work and detect 
contaminated surfaces in food processing facilities.
Discussion and conclusions
We described a point-source HA outbreak in north-
ern Germany with 83 laboratory-confirmed cases 
who developed symptoms between 8 October and 27 
December 2012. This is the largest recorded autoch-
thonous HA outbreak since the start of standardised 
surveillance in Germany in 2001. By means of the 
case–control study, we found a significant associa-
tion between HAV infections and being a customer of 
bakery X. In particular, consuming sweet pastries was 
identified as a significant risk factor. This epidemio-
logical evidence is supported by the strong laboratory 
evidence of the molecular identity of HAV sequences of 
Figure 4
Rooted maximum likelihood phylogenetic consensus tree 
for VP1/P2A nucleotide sequences of selected hepatitis A 
virus isolates, hepatitis A outbreak, northern Germany, 
2012
DE: Germany; TN: Tunisia; DZ: Algeria.
The sequences of the outbreak related strain cluster in Hepatitis A 
virus (HAV) subgenotype IA. The early case is shown in bold. The 
selected sequences represent the nearest homologs in GenBank 
and typical members of genotype I-VII (27).Genotype VII was 
used as an outgroup. Numbers at the nodes indicate bootstrap 
values of greater than 50%. Sequences are denoted by GenBank 
ID, isolate name (reference strains in italic), International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) country code and year of 
isolation. Sequence data from this paper have been deposited 
with the European Nucleotide Archive under Accession Nos. 
HF677201–HF677202.
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specimens from cases, the bakery X salesperson and 
surfaces inside bakery X shops. In addition, sequenc-
ing of non-residential cases confirmed their relation to 
the outbreak.
Onset of cases’ symptoms and travel data from non-
residential cases indicate that the period of infec-
tion may have lasted from 15 September to 3 October 
2012, but definitely covered the weekend of 22–23 
September 2012. In the telephone interviews, all five 
visitors with sequence-identical isolates reported 
having eaten sweet pastries or cake (apple cake or 
Bienenstich) from bakery X. Thus, epidemiological and 
laboratory results suggest that contaminated bakery X 
products were vehicles of infection.
It was not possible to test bakery X products for con-
taining HAV. There were no leftover samples from the 
period of infection due to the short shelf life of bakery 
products and the long incubation period of HA.
Considering the time of the salesperson’s disease 
onset and their work schedule, they might have worked 
while being infectious and contaminated baked goods 
and surfaces. A potential reason for sweet pastries 
being the vehicle of transmission could be the fact 
that those often are coated with fatty substances that 
help the virus to persist on the surface and maybe 
as well help to weather the acidic milieu of the stom-
ach. Furthermore, inactivation of HAV requires heating 
foods to >85 degrees Celsius for at least one minute 
and sweet pastries are usually not fully baked or have 
unheated fillings or toppings.
Since the salesperson was suffering from a chronic 
disease and was treated with cortisone, the secretion 
of virus in their stool might have started at very high 
titres one to two weeks prior to their onset of illness, 
and continued for several months at lower titres after 
their jaundice occurred. One month after onset of jaun-
dice, the titre was still at a high level (4.5x104 copies/
ml).
Figure 5
Alignment of hepatitis A virus VP1/P2A nucleotide sequences, hepatitis A outbreak, northern Germany, 2012
HBCK198007 1 CAATCATTCT GATGAATATT TGTCCTTTAG CTGTTACTTG TCTGTTACAG 50
HSCK100034 1 .......... .......... .......... T.....T... .....C.... 50
HBCK198007 51 AACAATCAGA GTTTTATTTT CCTAGAGCTC CATTGAATTC AAATGCTATG 100
HSCK100034 51 ....G..... ...C...... .......... ....A..... .......... 100
HBCK198007 101 TTGTCCACTG AGTCTATGAT GAGTAGAATT GCAGCTGGAG ACTTGGAGTC 150
HSCK100034 101 .......... .......... .......... .......... .T........ 150
HBCK198007 151 ATCAGTGGAT GATCCTAGAT CAGAGGAGGA CAGGAGATTT GAGAGTCATA 200
HSCK100034 151 ...G...... .......... .......... ...A...... .......... 200
HBCK198007 201 TAGAATGTAG AAAACCATAC AAGGAATTGA GATTGGAGGT TGGGAAACAA 250
HSCK100034 201 .......... G......... ..A....... ....A..... ...C...... 250
HBCK198007 251 AGACTTAAAT ATGCTCAGGA AGAGTTGTCA AATGAAGTGC TTCCACCTCC 300
HSCK100034 251 ..G..C.... .......... .......... .......... .......... 300
HBCK198007 301 TAGGAAAATG AAAGGGGTTT TTTCCCAGGC TAAAATTTCT CTTTTTTAT 349
HSCK100034 301 .......... ..G...C.A. ....A..A.. ...G...... ......... 349
The upper sequence was derived from the presumptive index case (HBCK198007, salesperson) and represents further eight identical 
sequences from five cases (serum specimen) and three surface specimens collected in the bakery X. The sequence from one notified non-
residential case differs significantly (HSCK100034, 21 mismatches, 94% similarity).
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It remains unclear where the infected salesperson and 
their close contact acquired their infections. However, 
we learned that the salesperson had packed and sold 
bakery products one to two weeks prior to the onset 
of jaundice, which correlates with the time period the 
visitors reported eating bakery X products. The epide-
miological results may raise questions about how nine 
of the cases might have been exposed as they were 
not costumers of bakery X. In fact, further investiga-
tion of these cases revealed that it was very likely that 
they all had consumed bakery X products, for example 
when visiting the homes of other bakery X customers. 
However, as we did not perform these extensive addi-
tional investigations for controls in the same way, we 
did not include this information into the case-control 
study’s analysis.
The laboratory investigation showed that HAV-positive 
human and surface specimens had identical RNA 
sequences, while one case differed. Therefore, we 
excluded this case from the case–control study and the 
outbreak. This shows the importance of accomplishing 
outbreak investigation by sequence-based molecular 
methods which can verify or disprove an assumed epi-
demiological link.
As a consequence of prompt outbreak management, 
the cooperation of all involved parties and follow-up 
with the cases by the regional health authority, only 
six secondary cases occurred and the outbreak was 
interrupted.
There were several limitations. Based on the long 
incubation period of HAV, a recall bias regarding the 
answers of consumed bakery items may have occurred. 
And, considering the age distribution and knowing that 
children have more often asymptomatic HAV infection 
[27], we assume that we did not identify every case.
Recommendations
Nationwide, two previously-reported HA outbreaks 
associated with baked goods were documented [13, 
28]. In both, contamination of filled or glazed pastries 
by a baker was the probable source of HAV infection. 
Both of these conclusions were based on epidemio-
logical evidence alone. In our study, we were able to 
sequence the HAV strains of the salesperson, primary 
cases and environmental specimens. It may be possi-
ble to avoid similar outbreaks in the future by address-
ing the potential spread of HAV through food handlers 
and educating food handlers as well as their employer 
to recognise hepatitis A symptoms and to be aware 
that HAV has a long incubation period.
Considering the high tenacity of HAV, we strongly rec-
ommend the supervised use of disinfectants with viru-
cidal activity against HAV and appropriate application 
of virucidal disinfection in outbreak situations.
For all food handlers, we recommend wearing plastic 
gloves while handling baked and unbaked products 
provided that correct handling is assured (e.g. chang-
ing gloves at the recommended intervals).
In view of the availability of an effective HAV vaccine 
[29] and several HA outbreaks with food handlers being 
the probable source, the evidence for the role of food 
handlers in HAV transmission and disease burden in 
Germany should be reviewed to inform a decision for a 
vaccination recommendation targeting food handlers.
Future risk assessment should determine whether 
food handlers with chronic diseases requiring immu-
nosuppressive treatment could be more at risk of con-
taminating food and might therefore benefit from HA 
immunisation.
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